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“In the eleven years that have passed since the creation of the term tribology1 in 1966, the 
huge number of some 55,000 papers have been published in the field of tribology…. Due to 
the multidisciplinary nature of tribology, the papers scatter broadly in purpose and content 
Therefore, although some progress in the different specialized subtopics of tribology were 
obtained, suitable tools are needed in order to link these and to prepare the way for 
cooperation between people of widely different disciplines” (Czichos, 1978, p.12) 
Abstract 
The paper examines the weaknesses in the models which currently inform research which 
uses HMRC microdata, in particular the corporation tax and income tax self-assessment 
datasets. It attributes much of the problem to failures of communication between 
disciplines; an issue which tribology identified and addressed in the 1960s. The paper 
describes the existing use of tribological phenomena as metaphors in both the economics 
and US legal literatures and proposes that these should be extended to provide a common 
language across tax research specialisms. It also identifies potential lessons from the ways in 
which tribology established itself as a unified discipline 
1. Background
My review of research outputs linked to the HMRC Datalab2 has revealed: 
 an unfortunate communication problem between disciplines
 a dangerously naïve approach to theory and model building,
Together these distort the questions which are being addressed; the research methods 
adopted; the interpretation of results; the influence on policy and practice; and the 
awarding of research funding. 
The shortcomings in the current research will be set out in more detail (though not yet 
comprehensively) in a separate paper (Massey, 2018) 3  at next week’s TARC conference 
1 “The science and technology of interacting surfaces in relative motion and of related subjects and 
practices” (Czichos, 1978, p.11) 
2 “The HMRC Datalab allows approved researchers to access de-identified HMRC data in a 
government accredited secure environment. The aim of the Datalab is to produce high quality 
analysis that benefits both HMRC and the wider research community” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-customs/about/research#the-hmrc-
datalab 
My research draws mainly on the outputs making use of data from the CT600 (corporation tax) 
returns and VAT returns from the 2000s. A full list of the datasets currently available can be found 
at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/hmrc-datalab-datasets-available  
3 A draft will be available by 16 April. 
hosted by Exeter University.  The Exeter paper will address the empirical problems of 
analysing and interpreting tax administration datasets. This paper will concentrate on the 
underlying models that currently inform this area of tax research. But for the purposes of 
illustration of the nature of the problem, here are two straightforward examples that 
require no detailed understanding of UK tax return data: 
 “Tax-accounting sales turnover is calculated using the cash-based method, which
focuses on actual cash receipts rather than their related sale transactions. Financial-
accounting turnover is calculated using the accrual method, which records sale
revenues when they are earned, regardless of whether cash from sales has been
collected.”
(Dechezleprêtre et al, 2018, p.10, fn.22) 
That “[t]he profits of a trade must be calculated in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting practice…”4 is one of the first things any accounting student 
learns about the taxation of companies (Melville, 2008, Ch.22 Introduction to 
corporation tax, p.364). UK GAAP does not permit the calculation of sales on a cash 
basis. 
 “A second anticipation effect could be that firms foresaw the increase in thresholds
and the precise timing of the UK government's response, following the European
Commission's earlier announcement in May 2003. This also seems very unlikely in
practice. The European announcement was a technical change, and it was unclear
how or whether the UK would react, let alone the precise rules and timing that would
be implemented. We have been unable to find any evidence in UK media that even
tax professionals expected the announcement on December 10.” (Maffini et al., 2017,
p.11)
This refers to an increase in the turnover and asset thresholds used to define a 
medium-sized company5. Companies coming within the new definition would qualify 
for more generous capital allowances.6  The levels of investment in plant & 
machinery before and after the change was the focus of the paper. 
However, the Government’s intention was signalled, at the latest, in April 2003 
Budget, well before the Commission’s final announcement.  
“The Budget 2003 builds on this support with a package of deregulatory reforms to 
ease burdens on SMEs, including raising the company law definitions of small- and 
medium-sized companies to the maximum possible under EU regulations. Legislation 
to establish the new definitions will be introduced as soon as the new EU maxima 
come into force. As a result of this…firms falling under the revised medium-sized 
company threshold will be eligible for the 40 per cent plant and machinery 
allowance…”  
4 CTA 2009, Section 46(1); formerly Finance Act 1998, Section 42(1) 
5 The Companies Act 1985 (Accounts of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Audit Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/16 
6 CAA 2001, Sections 44 and 48. Repealed by Finance Act 2008. 
(HM Treasury, Budget Report, 9 April 2003, para 3.31. Formatting changed) 
If academics are unaware of what, to practitioners, are basic tax rules and fundamental 
primary sources, then we have a problem. And this problem is not with individual authors. 
The research outputs quoted above and in the rest of this paper have been well-circulated 
within their own discipline, peer-reviewed, or examined as part of a PhD thesis (in some 
cases all three).  
This paper explores whether tribology – the study of friction, lubrication and wear – may 
help provide us with a solution. 
 Tribology, like taxation, is a practice as old as civilization. Its study was traditionally
split across many disciplines. However, unlike taxation, it seems to have found a way
to bring those disciplines together without any of them losing their distinctive
approaches or researchers being alienated from their original field.
 Tribological concepts are already used as metaphors in the taxation literature. The
concept of “frictions” appeared originally, and is used most widely, in economics:
see, for example, McCloskey (1983, p.501); Scholes et al (2005, Chapter 5); or Kleven
(2016).  From there it has spread to US legal scholars: Schizer (2001); Osofsky (2013);
and even been picked up, if only in passing, by fans of Bourdieu: Mulligan & Oats
(2009, p.688). Can we make wider use of the phenomena of tribology to create a
common language across our different disciplines?
2. Tribology
H. Peter Jost is the individual most closely identified with the establishment of tribology as a
distinct discipline. Jost himself, however, acknowledged the pioneering work of Professors
Bowden and Tabor at the Cavendish Laboratory, here in Cambridge, and recognised them as
the “forefathers of tribology” (1976, p.98)
In reference to another Cambridge scholar, and to illustrate that there was nothing new 
about the principles of tribology, Jost is said to have observed that: 
“If in the days of Newton, bananas had been available and Newton had slipped on one of 
them, the laws of tribology would have been enunciated by him there and then [….] Instead, 
it is said that an apple fell on him while he was asleep under the tree, and the laws of gravity 
resulted from there.” (Telegraph, 2016) 
The stimulus to integrate the discipline came in the 1960s and the ‘White Heat of 
Technology’7 programme. In 1964, Jost had been invited by the Government to form and 
chair the Lubrication Engineering (Education and Research) Working Group.  
7 For details of, and reflections on, Harold Wilson’s 1962 “White Heat” speech, see the blog of the School of 
Politics & International Relations, University of Nottingham 
www.nottspolitics.org/2013/10/10/special-edition-harold-wilsons-white-heat-speech-fifty-years-on/  
In the course of the Group’s work: 
“…it was found the English language, or any other language, had no existing word for the 
concept of ‘interacting surfaces in relative motion’ and its technical and economic 
consequences.” (Jost, 1990, p.1) 
So the word “tribology” was specially invented in consultation with the editor of the Oxford 
English Dictionary. It is based on the Greek “τρίβος” [rubbing]. The word first appeared in 
the Group’s report. This was published in 1966 as “Lubrication (Tribology) Education and 
Research – A Report on the Present Position and Industry’s Needs”. (Dowson, 1998, pp. 546-
7). Unsurprisingly, it is more usually referred to much more tersely as the “Jost Report”.   
Although the Jost Report was born out of a desire for “white hot technology” what the 
Group quickly identified was “… not even a ‘red-hot’ technology, but a very practical and 
down-to earth technology”.  There was already a great understanding of friction, lubrication 
and wear but the knowledge and experience was spread across disciplines.  
The Report estimated that over £500m (at 1965 prices) could be saved by British industry 
simply by the application of the then current knowledge, but it first needed to be 
transferred across academic disciplines and to/from industrial practice 
What they had, observed Jost 10 years later, “…was a ‘language’ translation problem.” 
“… at least three disciplines are involved: engineering, chemistry and metallurgy. Their 
languages are different ones. For instance, for engineering it is mathematics; for chemistry it 
is formulae; for metallurgy it is diagrammatic descriptions of the state of materials. No 
mathematics/chemistry or mathematics/metallurgy dictionaries exist. Thus the 
interconnection of subjects remained largely “untranslated…”  (1976, p.98) 
The early tribologists may only have had to translate across three major disciplines. Taxation 
has many more subjects that ideally ought to be able to understand one another: law; 
economics; history; accounting; politics; anthropology; psychology; sociology; and more. 
Creating individual dictionaries to translate directly from one of the tax disciplines to each of 
the others may be too great a challenge but the tribological concepts of friction, lubrication 
and wear may be a metaphor through which we can pool the insights of each of our 
specialisms. We need only translate our own work into the language of tribology to make it 
available to other scholars, and if they do the same, we can appreciate their insights without 
having to master their specialist language. 
3. “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it
means.” (The Princess Bride, 1987) 
 “A further general point which emerged with some force was that the word ‘lubrication’ 
meant different things to different people. It was generally used in a narrow technical sense 
which totally belied its economic and technical significance” (Dowson, 1998) 
Jost and his colleagues found they had a difficulty with “lubrication”.  Taxation’s equivalent 
is probably “avoidance”. One need look no further than “The Routledge Companion to Tax 
Avoidance Research” (Hashimzade & Epifantseva , 2018) to see the competing meanings 
adopted by many of the contributors. 
It is the ‘narrow technical sense’ in which economic model builders use the term ‘tax 
avoidance’ which I believe lies at root of a major weakness in the current HMRC Datalab 
research.  
The model that appears to inform this research is one summarised by Professor Osofsky of 
the Miami School of Law: 
“The economics literature sometimes distinguishes between different types of behavioral 
responses designed to reduce tax liability:  
 real shifts in underlying behavior in response to tax (such as a switch from work to
leisure);
 avoidance activity (or investing time and resources in order to find legal ways, other than
through changes in underlying behavior, to reduce tax liability); and
 evasion activity.”
(Osofsky, 2013, p.1062, fn.12, layout amended) 
Prof. Osofky refers to a 1996 IMF staff paper by Slemrod & Yitzhaki, but the more usual 
authority relied on by researchers is the version in chapter in the 2002 “Handbook of Public 
Economics, Volume 3” which sets out the same framework. 
To be fair to Slemrod & Yitzhaki, they make it very clear that “avoidance” in their framework 
“covers a broad range of behaviours” including simply paying “a tax professional to alert one 
to the tax deductibility of activities already undertaken”, and they alert readers to the 
existence of alternative definitions. (Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002, p.1428) 
However, I believe that Slemrod & Yitzhaki may lead users of the Handbook astray when, 
having listed examples of tax avoidance, they go on to suggest that: 
“Fine distinction among the types of behavioral response to taxation is not possible and is for 
many issues not crucial. In general, changes in the tax structure will induce all the different 
kinds of response. Indeed, one of the goals of this chapter is to emphasize the common 
analytical aspects of issues that have traditionally been kept distinct.” (p. 1429) 
The attempt to identify commonality between analyses is to be commended. But fine 
distinctions between behavioural responses are indeed both ‘possible’ and ‘crucial’.  
The models developed to analyse administrative microdata may not be able to make these 
fine distinctions or identify when they may matter. But rather than recognising these 
limitations and diffidently reporting – ‘We think we may have found something in the data 
can anyone explain this please?’ – modellers have been far too quick to assert that they 
have established the existence of avoidance/evasion and to recommend policy changes.   
All that they have, in fact, potentially identified are features that cannot be explained by 
“real shifts in behaviour”. The model is too crude to allow for conclusions beyond that. It 
has no categories other than avoidance or evasion with which to describe non-real 
behaviours. This may be adequate for conversations within the discipline where everyone 
ought to understand that ‘avoidance’ is a term-of-art. The problems arise when claims are 
made about the discovery of avoidance to the outside world without alerting the audience 
to the specialist definition. 
Sometimes an economist may have attempted to look further and explore the literature of 
other disciplines. But if they search there for ‘tax avoidance’ they will only have identified a 
very narrow range of behaviours. Though non-economists may draw the avoidance line in 
many different places, none of us are as broad as economists with our favoured definitions. 
Many of the features in the HMRC data which are not explained by real shifts in behaviour 
can in fact be accounted for by what the rest of us would identify as mundane tax 
compliance.  
For example, Brockmeyer (2014)  examined corporation tax return data8 from the 2000s. In 
the first half of this decade the UK had a starting rate of corporation tax of 10% and then 0% 
on taxable profits up to £10,0009 with profits immediately above that charged at a marginal 
rate of 22.5% or 23.75%. Unsurprisingly, the research identified a bunching of capital 
allowance claims at the £10,000 threshold. Brockmeyer suggests that part of this is 
attributable to avoidance or evasion. If what is meant is simply that the level of claims in the 
data did not represent changes in actual expenditure on plant & machinery then this is very 
probably true. But rather than describing these other explanations as simply “not real”, the 
model has led the author to label the alternatives as “avoidance or evasion”. In searching 
for illustrations of potential avoidance and evasion the paper has restricted itself to such 
things as misrepresentation of private expenditure or fake invoices; examples that all other 
disciplines will have been labelling as avoidance/evasion.  
However, the “avoidance” which probably explains most of the bunching is simply the 
routine working of the system. The CT600 data used in the study is taken from the boxes 
showing the amount of capital allowances claimed for the accounting period rather than the 
entries quantifying the qualifying expenditure incurred. Capital allowances are not 
deducted automatically in the calculation of taxable profits; they have to be claimed10.  
There is no requirement for a taxpayer to claim the maximum amount available. The claim 
for capital allowances is usually the very last stage in the computation of taxable trading 
profits and is therefore one of the easiest parts of the tax return to adjust. If the full claim 
8 More particularly numerical data from the CT600 Tax Return Form. Often overlooked by those using the 
HMRC datasets is the fact that the CT600 forms only part of the return. As the CT600 itself advises “A return 
includes a Company Tax Return form, any supplementary pages, accounts, computations and any relevant 
information.  
9 FA 1999, Sections 27-29 
10 CAA 2001, Section 3 
for capital allowances would have taken the taxable total profits below that £10,000 
threshold (and been totally wasted at a 0% tax rate), then most companies, or their 
advisers, would have restricted the claim and preserved that expenditure. The changes in 
claims at and around this threshold were largely nothing to do with changes in the 
companies’ qualifying expenditure but, rather, were a function of the exact amount that 
needed to be claimed to secure the 0% tax rate. 
Adjusting claims to capital allowances certainly does not represent a real shift in behaviour, 
but it is not helpful to have a model that does not distinguish between tax compliance 
(including the sort of automatic decisions that would be programmed into even the most 
basic tax software) on the one hand, and more creative uses of the tax environment on the 
other. 
4. Accounting researchers could have done more
Accounting researchers must take a share of responsibility for this. In 2002, Slemrod 
reflected back on over a dozen years’ worth of symposia bringing together accounting and 
economics academics. He observed that: 
“In 1990 I was preoccupied with the idea that all behavioral responses to taxation could be 
classified into three types:  
1. real responses like saving, investment, and labor supply,
2. responses that reshuffle, re–label, or re–characterize the real activities of the taxpayer,
and
3. timing responses that take advantage of changing tax rules or rates.
I thought, and still think, that this taxonomy nicely clarifies the relationship between the 
traditional economics focus on real behavior and the tax accounting literature on the 
structuring and, well, accounting for, transactions and operations of corporations.” 
(Slemrod, 2003, p. 147) 
No doubt Slemrod was correct in believing that his classification could effectively bring 
together traditional economics and the tax accounting literature. But it can only have been 
successful because of the lack of sophistication in that tax accounting literature. If the 
literature had captured the full range of behaviours, I am sure he would have refined his list. 
On the other hand, perhaps the taxonomy was adequate for classifying the behaviour of 
American corporations in the 1990s. But even if it was appropriate there and then, it is not 
sufficiently sophisticated, to cope with individuals and small enterprises in the UK decades 
later. It appears, though, from the UK literature that his taxonomy has been adopted here 
with very little evidence of reflection on its validity.  
5. Examples from Gift Aid11.
If I were act on last month’s advice from HM Treasury and HMRC and “Tick the Gift Aid 
box” where would my behaviour fit into the model?  
(GOV.UK, 2018) 
Clearly it is not a real response as I am not donating anything extra. 
Clearly not evasion as the tax authorities are positively encouraging me to do it. 
I am, though, re-characterising my donation. I am changing it from a simple gift of cash 
which is ignored by the tax system, to a “qualifying donation”12. But is it helpful to describe 
this as “avoidance”? 
When I complete my self-assessment return online, the Help message encourages me to 
reduce my tax liabilities by 
treating Gift Aid payments I have 
made since 6 April as made in 
the previous year13. 
If I act on this suggestion, my 
response is neither evasion nor a 
real effect, but what is the most 
useful label to attach to it? 
Note the warning that “(You 
can’t do this on an amended 
Return)”.  Mr Cameron 
discovered this to his 
considerable cost14.  
11 ITA 2007, Part 8, Chapter 2 
12 ITA 2007, Section 416 
13 ITA 2007, Section 426 
14 Cameron v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 104 (TC) 
Mr Cameron established charitable trusts in January 2007 on the understanding he could 
carry back donations of almost £1 million pounds to the 2005-06 tax year – a year during 
which he had realised substantial capital gains. Unfortunately, Mr Cameron had been too 
compliant a taxpayer and had submitted his self-assessment return back in September 2006 
rather than waiting until the deadline of 31 January 2007. HMRC denied the carry-back 
claim which Mr Cameron made in an amended return.  
As the first-tier tribunal judge, Charles Hellier, noted in the very first paragraph of his 
judgement: 
“This is a case where common sense and fairness appear to be on the taxpayer’s side.  If I were 
permitted to use only those concepts as my guides I would find for the taxpayer.” 
Here we have a real response to the Gift Aid rules but with a tax effect very different from 
that expected. Without a model that recognises such phenomena, those using 
administrative data may not be alert to the existence of responses which are not reflected 
in it. If HMRC have corrected their computer records to reflect the judgment then Mr 
Cameron’s donations will be reported in 2006-07 only. It would be easy to mistake features 
like this in the data and to draw incorrect inferences from it, either in relation to other 
entries in the return or to changes in the tax system.  
The Cup Trust15 is another case that does not fit neatly in the models. If successful, the Cup 
Trust arrangements would have generated tax reliefs of £55m in terms of higher-rate 
income tax relief to the 300-400 ‘donors’ and £46m repayment of basic rate tax to the 
‘charity’. The donors contributed £155,000 so there had been a real shift in behaviour 
(though barely 0.1% of the tax saving.) 
The only place for this in Slemrod’s framework is as a ‘real response’. The Scheme did not 
display a timing response nor did it involve a ‘reshuffle, re–label, or re–characterize the real 
activities of the taxpayer’; the scheme was constructed always to be labelled and 
characterized as qualifying for Gift Aid and the real activities were only undertaken on that 
basis.  
With a scheme as extreme as this, we might be tempted to ignore the actual charitable 
donations and say that it fits squarely within ‘avoidance’ in the Slemrod & Yitzhaki model.  
But what if the real response and the avoidance activity were more evenly balanced?  It 
would be helpful to have a model that was more nuanced in its categorisation of behaviour. 
While I do argue below that the model/framework needs to be more sophisticated to 
capture the full range of behaviours (even in response to something as straightforward as 
Gift Aid), at least research underpinned by this model is stronger than work that appears to 
have no theoretical foundation to inform its study of taxpayer responses. 
15 Charity Commission for England and Wales v Mountstar (PTC) Ltd and others  - [2016] EWHC 876 
(Ch), [2016] WLR(D) 201, [2016] Ch 612, [2016] 3 WLR 218 
The ‘donations’ in the Trust Cup scheme were made between January and December 201016.  
Research into charitable giving using income tax return data from the HMRC Datalab has 
been conducted which: 
 “exploit[s] the 2010 income tax reform in the UK, which raised the top tax rate from 40% to 
50% for incomes above £150,000, and also created a short bracket with a 60% rate above 
£100,000” (Almunia et al. 2018, p.3).  
The authors report that “high-income individuals respond more on the intensive margin” 
(p.1) and will donate more following an increase in the tax rate (price elasticity of -0.25). 
However, the paper appears to assume that the increase in Gift Aid claims represents a 
simple increase in funds available to charities. No attention seems to have been paid to how 
much of the change might be attributable to schemes such as the Trust Cup. None of the 
words: “real”, “avoidance” or “Slemrod” appear in a word search within the paper17 
This lack of a theory which incorporates tax avoidance (however defined) is particularly 
worrying in this instance.  
The last named and corresponding author was held out by her institution, University of 
Warwick, as being an expert on Gift Aid in one of its REF2014 impact case studies for UOA18 
– Economics and Econometrics:
“HMRC and HM Treasury officials invited sector representatives to participate in an open 
forum (HM Treasury (2010)), and the final report of this forum drew on the 2009 report to 
outline proposals for Gift Aid reform (Fanning (2010)). More recently, Scharf’s research 
underpins the entire section of “Coalition Government proposals to encourage philanthropy” 
in their plans regarding Gift Aid reform (House of Commons (2012a)).  
 Scharf’s research also triggered a spirited public discussion about the role of charitable 
donations in public life and their tax treatment. This came to a head in late Spring 2012 
when the Government proposed to cap tax relief for deductions, including charitable 
deductions.   
 The uproar from charities and their donors was immediate. 19 charities cited Scharf and 
Smith (2009) in making public statements or policy proposals since 2008 about Gift Aid or 
the cap on charitable deductions. Scharf provided non-academic presentations and blog 
posts, several of which were prominently reported in the media. The Guardian editorial of 17 
April 2012 concluded Scharf and Smith (2009) offered the "best evidence" on tax incentives 
16 [2016] Ch 618D 
17 At least the latest version of this discussion paper is not as reckless as earlier ones. These claimed to have 
found “a substantial extensive-margin elasticity of -0.8” (now reduced to -0.25), with a final conclusion that 
“…the elasticity estimates we obtain can be taken as an indication that the incentives for charitable giving in 
the UK should, if anything, be extended rather than reduced.” This has been replaced by references only to 
warm-glow opportunities. (Almunia et al., 2017) 
(Guardian (2012)) and both authors discussed their research on the Today programme (BBC 
Radio 4). In response to the uproar, the Government did a quick U-turn:  while the cap on 
deductions was indeed introduced in April 2013, charitable deductions are excluded from this 
limit (House of Commons (2012b)).”  
 (REF2014, 2104) 
I have not reviewed any of the references cited in the Warwick submission. They may well 
have properly considered potential abuses of the Gift Aid system, but, from the evidence of 
the Datalab paper, it would be reckless to assume that the recommendations flowing from 
earlier research have been based on a model which incorporates non-real responses. While 
we cannot rely on the opinion in Guardian editorials, how far might “best evidence” have 
been based on naïve assumptions and potentially undermined a worthwhile reform of the 
income tax regime?  
How much stronger could this sort of research be, if the default approach by economists 
were to consider what legal or practitioner scholarship may have to say about the possibility 
or prevalence of avoidance? Or if they triangulated their initial findings against the results of 
qualitative researchers investigating high-worth individuals? Equally, what if their work 
were shared more widely at an early stage, rather than restricted to fora where only other 
economists usually venture?  
And what if all disciplines took a little time and space to present their work in a way more 
comprehensible to those from other fields? 
6. Bridging the gap
Apart from some of the most egregious schemes of avoidance (on anyone’s definition), 
there is little secret about what accountants and other tax advisers do. Many of our 
behaviours are boringly predictable. Yet for some reason they remain hidden from academic 
researchers.  
As a tax professional, how do I translate what I do into terms academics (from any 
discipline) can understand? How can researchers translate their questions and findings into 
terms that I can readily comprehend? 
Some of the problem may simply be a question of terminology. 
I am going to find it difficult to think of that old £10,000 corporation tax threshold as a “… 
threshold at which the marginal tax rate changes discontinuously” (Brockmeyer, 2014, 
p.479)  or a “discontinuit[y] in the slope of choice sets” (Kleven, 2016, p.435). It’s just not the
way I’d talk with other practitioners or clients.
But if economists want to label it a “kink point” and then give me a couple more examples 
of what they mean by “kinks”, I’ll soon get the idea.  
Similarly, references to “extensive margin” (are more clients doing Z?) and “intensive 
margin” (are clients doing more of Z?) should be readily translatable. It does not matter if Z 
is investment in plant & machinery (Brockmeyer, 2014); Charitable giving (Almunia et al. 
2017 and 2018); or, in a US context, working to increase entitlement to Earned Income Tax 
Credits (Saez, 2010), I will quickly get the meaning. 
Once I am aware of the specialist terminology I can tag my outputs appropriately so that 
they will show up in literature searches. Or I can take a little space to explain in an 
accessible way how my work may be of use to researchers in other disciplines, in language 
that is readily accessible to them. I can cast what I do and what I find in those terms and 
provide the fine, qualitative, details that could help inform questions to be asked of the 
microdata or to interpret the results. 
Once we make a little effort to understand what our opposite numbers are interested in and 
how we each label (or not) identical concepts, it could be comparatively straightforward to 
construct a dictionary to translate between two disciplines. But such an approach becomes 
unwieldy if we want to communicate with the whole community of tax researchers, as it 
would not accommodate differences in underlying approaches (rather than merely 
vocabulary). A simple dictionary will not be effective either where disciplines have very 
different epistemologies or ontologies. 
Tribology may provide the metaphors through which we can share a way of describing the 
phenomena we all encounter. It could provide a structure within which we could classify 
features of interest to us as lubricants and frictions which drive (or attenuate) the responses 
of individuals and companies to the tax system no matter which discipline we may come 
from. 
7. Friction, lubrication and wear
The approach in economics starts with a model which identifies a theoretical optimal tax 
position and then needs to explain why the data does not correspond to the prediction.  
One of the broad lessons that Kleven derives from his review of the “bunching” literature is 
that while the bunching approach might provide compelling evidence of behavioural 
responses it has not been easy to move from the observations to predictions in policy 
changes. He observes that: 
“This is particularly true in the context of labor supply—the context for which 
the bunching approach was initially developed—due to a range of optimization frictions that 
attenuate bunching and are difficult to observe and model. These frictions include aspects 
such as hours constraints, search costs, inattention, and uncertainty. Such frictions imply 
that any evidence of sharp bunching in earnings likely results from tax evasion or tax 
avoidance rather than real labor supply responses.” (2016, p. 436) 
Again, the simplicity of the modellers’ framework, obliges Kleven to label all non-real 
responses as “tax avoidance or tax evasion”. 
I will leave the question of whether these ‘optimization frictions’ are difficult to model to 
the specialist modellers, but I would suggest that they are certainly not difficult to observe. 
They are phenomena that tax practitioners see every day. Tax advisers earn their living by 
taking the time to determine the intimate details of the frictions that keep each client away 
from the ideal tax position, and by mastering the range of lubricants available to them to 
ease the client to a better place on a tax schedule. But because advisers do not speak in 
those terms, what they know and do may remain hidden to those outside their domain. 
Often the kink points and the lubricants used are so much part of day-to-day compliance 
activities, that they may not even be considered worth writing about.   
If the intention of modellers is to determine parameters to guide policy (rather than being 
prompted merely out of intellectual curiosity) then we all have an interest (if only as 
taxpayers) in ensuring these numbers are as reliable as possible and that the level of 
uncertainty is clearly identified. 
Legal scholars in the US have already suggested thinking carefully about frictions when 
considering anti-avoidance legislation.  
Prof Schizer of Columbia Law School in his paper “Frictions as a constraint on tax planning” 
specifically borrows Scholes & Wolfson’s definition: 
“By tax friction we mean transaction costs incurred in the marketplace that make 
implementation of certain tax planning strategies costly” (Schizer, 2001, p.135. Scholes & 
Wolfson, 2005, p.9) 18 
Schizer provides a methodology (along with detailed worked examples) for determining 
whether these frictions can be effective in blocking avoidance. He also makes the point that 
“If a friction blocks a transaction than the tax law does not have to block it to”.  
If we had been more aware in the UK of the effect of these sorts of frictions then we might 
have had now a much more effective tax system for small businesses. For example, much of 
the literature looking at changes to the tax system in the 2000s (and which seems to inform 
our current thinking) has concentrated simply on changes to the law, such as the 
introduction of the 0% corporation tax rate, and tries to explain behaviours in those terms. 
What appears to have been overlooked is the erosion of all those frictions that had 
previously stood in the way of incorporation – audit requirements; disclosures and 
inefficiencies at Companies House; stamp duty on goodwill; the reporting requirements 
imposed by advanced corporation tax; or tax return requirements (changes to the CGT 
pages of the self-assessment return meant that payments for goodwill of up to £30,000 (no 
matter how dubious) could be omitted altogether), etc. It was these sorts of frictions that 
had previously blocked “abuses” of incorporation – not specific anti-avoidance provisions or 
the precise tax rate. 
Schizer looked in detail at the role of frictions in limiting avoidance in dealings in securities, 
but he was able to draw a more universal conclusion 
“More generally, to rely on frictions, reformers need information about them: how much 
they matter to taxpayers, whether they can be avoided through restructuring, and other 
pragmatic issues. These facts usually are not publicly reported, and hard data is seldom 
available. As a result, reformers need assistance in learning about frictions. The factual 
intricacies of sophisticated commercial transactions, however, are not commonly detailed in 
law reviews. More attention to these matters is warranted, and legal academics should offer 
18 Schizer quotes from the first (1992) edition. The definition is unchanged in the third (2005) edition. 
greater assistance. Without a grounding in frictions, transactional reforms are unlikely to 
play a constructive role.” (p. 1396) 
I think we could usefully take his conclusion further and propose that tax policy makers 
generally need assistance in learning about frictions and that all academics, not just legal 
ones, should offer greater assistance. This applies to all elements of the tax system and not 
just sophisticated commercial transactions. 
Osofsky (2013) provides a useful review of the development of the legal friction literature. 
She brings together tax law and optimal tax theory in a way that I think will be accessible to 
both lawyers and economists who may be unfamiliar with each other’s disciplines.  
For those of you forming policy or drafting legislation (whether inside or outside the tax 
field), she also offers guidance on how to create effective frictions. For the present 
purposes, though, I just want to take on Schizer’s challenge to make the “factual intricacies” 
of the tax system visible across disciplines. 
8. A framework and a pilot study
I believe tribology may allow us to side-step the struggle, as identified by Oats & Morris 
(2018, p.1), for control over the definition of terms such as ‘tax avoidance’. Let’s see if it can 
provide us with more neutral categories. Each discipline, when talking to itself, can lump 
together the phenomena in whichever way is most useful for its own purposes: 
acceptable/unacceptable; avoidance/planning; responsible/unethical. But let’s try to find a 
way of working together without having to argue about definitions, or constantly check 
what exactly is meant. 
Hasseldine and Morris (2018, p.3) have already proposed “that rather than focus on the 
‘true meaning’ of a particular term what is more important is an understanding of the 
characteristics or qualities of actual tax-related behaviour undertaken and an appreciation 
of the context within which the behaviour is to be understood.” 
They have proposed a temporal framework – appraisal, implementation, compliance – 
within which to place taxpayer behaviour. This seems useful structure within which to begin 
to build a catalogue of behaviours and to identify the particular frictions/lubrications 
associated with each of them. 
A topic urgently in need of treatment is the behaviours around the VAT registration 
threshold. HM Treasury (2018) last month put out  “A call for evidence to explore whether 
the design of the VAT threshold could better incentivise growth.” (Closes 5 June) 
In the Foreword Mel Stride, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, has put his name to an 
assertion that:  
“… there is growing anecdotal, academic and data-based evidence that the cliff-edge nature 
of the VAT threshold acts as a disincentive for small business owners who want to expand.” 
Unfortunately, my impression of the evidence put forward in the Call is that the anecdotes 
are exactly the same as they have been for decades and the academics don’t understand 
what they are doing with the data. My evidence for this is spread across disciplines and 
needs to be brought together. 
The poor treatment of the data could be put down, from the perspective of a practitioner, 
to the arrogance of economists. This is something that a dictionary won’t solve, but 
tribology may still have something to teach us. 
9. “You can’t afford to ignore X”
The reason practitioners and modellers might fall out can be seen in the papers reporting on 
research into the corporation tax dataset 
Corporation tax is charged on “profits” but they are not the same “profits” which determine 
the tax rate. And the list of rates and thresholds that appear in our Tax Tables are just the 
starting point for the computation.  
Tax advisers are used to working to a code of ethics which includes obligations in respect of 
“professional competence and due care”. In particular a tax adviser 
“… must carry out his work with a proper regard for the technical and professional standards 
expected. In particular, a member must not undertake professional work which he is not 
competent to perform unless he obtains appropriate assistance from a suitably qualified 
specialist.” 
(Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2016, para 2.11) 
Not every discipline may demonstrate the same level of self-awareness regarding the limits 
of their competence. 
It is easy for advisers to take it for granted that our professional audiences fully appreciate 
the niceties of the former Section 13 ICTA88 … 
ICTA 1988, Section 13 (as originally enacted) 
… before attempting to use tax return data to determine a company’s marginal tax rate. Or 
that if they are not familiar with it, they will seek “appropriate assistance from a suitably 
qualified specialist” regarding the significance of “P” and of associated companies rather 
than just assuming that “I” is all they need.  
Unfortunately, not every researcher does take that sensible precaution, for example: 
Brockmeyer (2014), Devereux et al.  (2014), Maffini et al. (2016), Guceri & Liu (2017), 
Devereux et al. (2018). This is particularly unfortunate where the ability to use tax return 
data to determine precisely a company’s marginal tax rate appears to be one of the main 
claims made to justify the research.  
The lack of diffidence within economics will come as no surprise to many researchers; see 
for example, Fourcade et al. (2015) on the superiority of economists. The history of 
tribology as a combined discipline may, though, offer us a model to address this.  
The suggestion which follows is not based on a rigorous study of that history, but rather a 
snatched conversation19 with the honorary professor in UCLan’s Jost Institute of 
Tribotechnology, Ted Smith. I trust I am not misrepresenting him here. 
Prof Smith gained his MSc in Tribology from Leeds University in 1972 (University of Central 
Lancashire, 2018). He was one of the first graduates of the Masters degrees established as a 
result of recommendations from the Jost Report (Dowson, 1998, p. 547).  Prof Smith’s top-
of-the-head response to my question as to how tribology had brought the disparate 
disciplines together was the creation of those Masters programmes. The courses provided 
students with a solid grounding in all the contributing fields. The graduates would go on to 
specialise but they came away with a lasting message from every discipline that “You can’t 
afford to ignore X” – whatever X might be for that particular subject. 
Establishing effective Masters programmes (to include solid contributions from all areas of 
academic research and professional scholarship – not just two or three) may not be possible 
in the short-term and will only benefit fully the next generation of taxation researchers.  
For the benefit of those of us who may now be firmly set in our ways, we could, perhaps, 
each try to work out what the X is for our respective disciplines. What is the essential insight 
from our theory, model or empirical data that all other tax researchers should keep in mind? 
Can we capture that in a single paper, chapter, or one side of A4, and explain it in a way that 
is accessible to everyone?  
I am not yet certain what the X is that the tax profession has to offer but I will put forward 
some initial thoughts at the conference. 
19 In a short email correspondence following our meeting, Prof Smith suggested that we “could 
perhaps extend the analogy and consider wasted time and effort as energy loss !”. Without trying to 
push the metaphors too far, it may be that tribological phenomena offer assistance beyond simply 
friction and lubrication. 
10. Concluding thoughts
BIT themselves recognise that many of their insights are "relatively intuitive". Front-line tax 
collectors and inspectors would probably put it more strongly. I would suggest that these 
insights seem to reflect little more than daily and local practice in the days before the fine 
details of HMRC/Inland Revenue communications and processes were homogenised without 
first capturing that collective wisdom. We would not have needed to wait decades for the 
"Behavioural Sciences" to be discovered if we had found a way to transfer our then current 
knowledge between and amongst areas of practice and academic disciplines.
Looking back over 10 years of tribology, Jost pointed to savings in manufacturing alone of 
£300m a year (at 1976 prices) for a total expenditure of under £1.5 million incurred in 
establishing the unified discipline. 
He concluded his reminiscence with an exhortation to other fields. 
“WEALTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE is one of the means—the cheapest of them all—of creating 
increased national wealth. Let us therefore look at tribology, and its worldwide success, and 
let us look round and we will see that there are other spheres in which with a similar 
comparatively small effort, spectacular results can be obtained for the nation.” 
(Jost, 1976, p.100) 
We may be forty years late, and we may now think more internationally, but perhaps taxation 
is one of those other spheres where we might gain some spectacular results for 
comparatively small effort. 
The Jost report had estimated annual savings in the 
UK of over £500m (at 1965 prices)  through the 
adoption of better tribological practices  - savings that 
did not require new research but only the application 
of current knowledge. The breakdown of the 
prospective savings are shown in the diagram on the 
right (Halling, 1975, pp. 10-11). 
I have not yet attempted to list, still less quantify, all 
the potential benefits of applying fully our collective 
understanding of taxation, but the experience of the 
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) may offer an 
indication.
To set their work in context BIT drew on a 2012 
Cabinet Office report and suggested that:
"Fraud, error and debt cost the UK economy billions of 
pounds each year – £21 billion is lost to fraud in the 
public sector, a further £9.6 billion is lost to errors, 
while £7–8 billion is lost in uncollected debt." (2014, 
p.3).
They make the common error of confusing the 
Government with the economy but it gives an idea of 
the sums at stake. And they are before we even being 
to think about compliance costs of individuals and 
businesses or inefficiencies within HMRC. 
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